Creativity, Humour, and Cognition by Gensollen, Mario & Jiménez-Rolland, Marc
Creativity, Humour, and Cognition
Mario Gensollen
UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE AGUASCALIENTES 
mgenso@correo.uaa.mx 
Marc Jiménez-Rolland 





This paper explores some aspects of the scientific study of creativity by focusing on intentional 
attempts to create instances of linguistic humour. We argue that this sort of creativity can 
be accounted for within an influential cognitive approach but that said framework is not a 
recipe for producing novel instances of humour and may even preclude them. We start by 
identifying three great puzzles that arise when trying to pin down the core traits of creativity, 
and some of the ways taken by Cognitive Studies in this quest. We then consider what we call 
‘creative humour’, which exhibits the core features of the aforesaid creativity. We then explore 
how a key cognitive approach to human communication can account for creative humour. 
We end by drawing lessons and highlighting limitations to cognitive approaches to creativity.
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INTRODUCTION
In ‘The Hesitation Ramification’, an episode of the 
popular sitcom The Big Bang Theory, Dr. Sheldon 
Cooper is searching for a Unified Theory of Comedy. 
He deems this pursuit a mere intellectual curiosity, 
since he describes himself as ‘hysterical’. Envisaging 
such a theory, one can imagine it would not only 
provide a deeper understanding of human humour, 
but it would yield the advantage (especially important 
for someone like Sheldon) of allowing one “…to elicit 
laughter from anyone at any time (unless they’re 
German, ’cause that’s a tough crowd)”. As it is often 
the case in the show, one is left wondering exactly 
how Dr. Cooper’s endeavours are doomed to fail, 
whether due to a lack of ability, a flaw in execution 
or even whether the goal itself is a wild-goose chase. 
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One can readily accept that a unified theory is not a 
precondition for creating humour. The main question 
we address in this paper is whether developing such 
a theory would help in creating humour.
In broad terms, this paper explores a paradox concerning 
the scientific study of creativity. The result is an 
outline of the ‘paradox for a theory of creativity’. A 
scientific theory should convey information about 
the phenomena it covers. If there is a theory, it follows 
that the phenomena are not novel. Furthermore, it is 
widely believed that an explanatory theory should 
render its outcomes predictable. Put another way, 
its outcomes should be unsurprising in the light of 
the scientific explanations given. Yet both novelty 
and unpredictability seem to be the hallmarks of 
creativity. It would thus seem that creativity cannot 
possibly be explained by a scientific theory. Although 
we deem some aspects of the paradox to be grounded 
on misconceptions about scientific theories, here we 
stress those linked to creativity. To tackle these issues, 
we focus on a narrower target by addressing attempts 
to intentionally produce creative instances of linguistic 
humour. If one can find a theory explaining this kind of 
creativity, there may be hope for a full-blooded cognitive 
explanation of overall creativity. We argue that much 
of what is interesting about humorous creativity can be 
accounted for within the framework of an influential 
cognitive approach and by producing algorithmic 
inference patterns (whether conscious or not). This, 
however, does not mean that such an approach will 
“elicit laughter from anyone at any time.” It is highly 
unlikely that anyone will hit upon “a fool-proof recipe 
for generating humor stimuli of all varieties” (Hurley et 
al., 2011, p. x). Indeed, a theory on humorous effects 
could even preclude them because everyone knows a 
common way to kill a joke is to explain it.1 We therefore 
try to show that the ‘paradox for a theory of creativity’ 
is based on an illusion that — like The Cheshire Cat 
— ends up vanishing.
 1 Thus, one could agree with the New Yorker’s cartoonist 
Robert Mankoff, who — retrieving E. B. White quip — points 
out that “analyzing humor is like dissecting a frog. Few 
people are interested, and the frog dies of it” (2009, p. ix).
To support our thesis, we will first identify three 
great puzzles that arise when trying to naturalise 
creativity. After explaining each of these puzzles, 
we outline ways in which cognitive studies have 
tried to solve them. In a second section, we focus on 
the links between creativity and humour. Although 
there is much of empirical interest on this score, we 
shall confine discussion to what we call ‘creative 
humour’. After a ready-made characterisation, we 
will show how creative humour displays the core 
features of creativity identified earlier. The third 
section shows how a major cognitive approach to 
human communication can account for creative 
humour. Although cognitive studies of creativity 
have much to offer, we end by drawing lessons 
and highlighting some limitations for a robust 
naturalisation of creativity as a phenomenon for 
enquiry by the discipline. 
NATURALISING CREATIVITY
Creativity is one of Man’s hallmarks as a species. 
We engage in creative tasks in many key areas such 
as Science, Engineering, Art, Design, Gastronomy, 
Entertainment, Sports, and a host of other practices 
and activities, in which the term ‘creative’ is applied 
to agents, processes, and products. Moreover, 
creativity appears to be a solely human trait; when 
it is extrapolated to inert physical processes, there 
seems to be an assumption that rational agency 
is somehow involved. Although acknowledging 
its special features, a successful naturalisation of 
creativity would yield an understanding akin to 
that found in scientific scrutiny in other fields. 
To gain such understanding, we must be able to 
show that creativity involves physical entities 
and mechanisms that can be embodied within a 
systematic theory. However, there seem to be special 
hurdles to recognising creativity as a phenomenon 
within the natural order. We go on to identify three 
such hurdles to naturalizing creativity: (1) semantic 
diversity; (2) normativity; (3) unpredictability. After 
discussing them, we outline some ways in which 
these hurdles might be overcome.
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The first challenge for coming up with a scientific 
theory of creativity is to pin down what the subject 
matter of such a theory should be. The term 
‘creativity’ is associated with a vast array of meanings. 
Being creative seems to involve fluency, flexibility, 
divergent thinking, innovation, discovery, originality, 
spontaneity, genius, wit, ingenuity, shrewdness, 
imagination, insight, acumen, and so forth. It 
can be argued that ‘creativity’ belongs to a large 
semantic family with countless relatives. Thus, the 
term ‘creativity’ seems to exhibit a semantic diversity 
that makes it ill-suited for scientific theorising. As 
Stokes and Paul pointed out: 
We find creativity not only in art but also in 
science, theorizing of any sort, engineering, 
business, medicine, sport, gaming, and so on. At 
least two worries may be developed accordingly. 
First, given the complexity of any one of these 
individual domains, we might worry that there 
are simply too many variables to allow for a clear 
explanation (…). The second worry concerns 
generalizability. Even supposing that we could 
explain the creative achievement of some artistic 
master, any such explanation will have to be so 
specific that it will fail to generalize to artistic 
creativity, or creativity in other domains like 
science or gaming or whatever. In short, given 
the variety of creativity (and the complexity of 
the varied creative achievements), identifying 
a general explanation, in the form of a set of 
cognitive and behavioral features, may seem 
entirely improbable (2016, p. 320).
Although this might seem a case of rampant 
ambiguity, there is at least one constant element 
in most conceptions of creativity, namely, they all 
appear to involve some kind of novelty (Cropley, 
2011, p. 511). However, being novel is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for being creative.
Normativity constitutes the second challenge to 
drawing up a scientific theory of creativity. Let us 
consider the case of novelty without creativity. This 
can be illustrated by considering drug patents. In 
some countries, drug prices can only legally be raised 
if pharmaceutical companies can prove that the drug 
has been modified, thus justifying the need to recoup 
the cost for the development of new drugs. Thus, 
drug patents can be extended so long as companies 
make changes to the product. Yet many observers 
consider companies abuse the system, making trifling 
changes to existing drugs just so they can re-file 
the patents — a practice known in the industry as 
‘evergreening’ and ‘product hoping’ (Ward, Hickey 
and Richards, 2020, pp. 1-2, 19-24). Legally, the 
companies do not have to prove that the new drug 
is any better than the old formulation, merely that 
it is not worse. Although such cosmetic modification 
is legal, it is clearly not creative. This is why some 
argue that companies should not be allowed to extend 
their patent rights by using such a ruse given that 
novelty without value is hardly creative. This raises 
the question as to why we value some novel ideas 
but not other. What is valuable may vary across the 
spectrum of human interests. Naturalising the value 
of creativity involves at least three steps. The first 
step is to identify our goals. The second is to show 
how those goals are useful. The third is to explain 
how ‘creative’ achievements meet those goals. On 
these lines, full naturalisation of normativity would 
require the properties expressed by evaluative or 
normative terms (in this case, the term ‘creative’ to 
be natural or to depend upon natural properties). 
The third hurdle is that creativity does not seem to 
fit into the natural order of things. For something to 
be creative, it is usually suggested that it should not 
be caused or conditioned. A common way to spell 
out this apparent feature of creativity is to invoke the 
quasi-esoteric acceptance of an inexplicable source 
of inspiration (we can trace the lineage of this idea 
back to Plato). However, we think that this way 
of understanding the nature of the challenge can 
lead to confusion. That is because it relies on the 
assumption that a naturalistic theory should always 
have predictive power. If it fails to provide accurate 
predictions, non-natural explanations may be at fault. 
Another way to state the problem recognises that 
the phenomena dealt with by a theory of creativity 
should somehow be unpredictable. This challenge 
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acknowledges that, while it is quite possible that a 
theory lacks predictive ability, it may still provide 
bona fide naturalistic explanations (as, for example, 
does Evolutionary Biology). The challenge lies in 
demonstrating such theories’ robust explanatory 
power while saying why they do not serve for making 
predictions.
There are some promising ways in which these 
challenges have been addressed by cognitive studies 
of creativity. Regarding the first one, it has been 
argued that the concept of creativity is an integrative 
or inclusive one. The complexity and polysemy of 
the concept imply that when we address different 
perspectives, we find that they overlap and interact 
with one another. If the concept of creativity were 
not an inclusive one, we could not refer to it as a 
conceptual category (Estany and Herrera, 2016, p. 96). 
With regard to the normativity hurdle, several 
attempts at naturalisation have been made. 
Nevertheless, creative instances could only be assessed 
in relation to a vast array of human interests. Why is a 
creative instance valuable? Why do we seem to value 
creativity in general? This second issue may deepen 
our knowledge on the first one. Given the complexity 
of individual domains, creative instances may lead us 
to conclude that there are simply too many variables 
to allow us to come up with a clear explanation. 
Nonetheless, we can find a promising path from 
novelty to normativity by drawing a distinction 
between someone who is psychologically creative 
(P-creative) and someone who is historically creative 
(H-creative): “…some people repeatedly produce 
ideas highly regarded as valuable — and which, so 
far as is known, no one else has ever had before (…) 
Most people, by contrast, produce only moderately 
interesting ideas, many of which are already known 
by other people” (Boden, 2009, p. 237). Although, 
what we regard as interesting and valuable varies, 
there are many different ways for something to be 
praised as valuable, and historical creativity is very 
hard to gauge. One way of unravelling this problem 
is to first understand psychological creativity (for 
this is at least necessary for historical creativity) 
and then understand how someone comes up with 
a wholly new idea.2
Regarding the third hurdle, it has been argued that 
creativity is compatible with determinism and therefore 
with naturalistic explanation (Kronfeldner, 2009). 
Psychological creativity seems to involve some kind 
of originality and spontaneity and thus seems to be 
independent from social learning, experience and prior 
knowledge. Nonetheless, as Kronfeldner shows, this 
independence is compatible with determinism. While 
creativity appears to be opposed to specific causal 
factors, it does not exclude causal determination. Thus, 
as we pointed out earlier, the third hurdle is not an 
insurmountable one. Additionally, Boden (2009) has 
pointed out that different kinds of creativity operate 
within the framework of a shared conceptual base or 
within conceptual spaces and thus creativity is not at 
odds with restrictions. Moreover, as Boden suggests 
“…exploratory creativity, the existing stylistic rules 
or conventions are used to generate novel structures 
(ideas), whose possibility may or may not have been 
realised before the exploration took place” (2009, 
p. 241).
As we saw above, although novelty is a recurring 
element in the various definitions of creativity, 
seizing on a given example does not prove the link. 
Fortunately, Boden provides a useful definition that 
allows us to capture the main features mentioned so far, 
without raising further issues on the aforementioned 
three hurdles. She defines creativity as “…the ability 
to come up with ideas that are new, surprising, and 
valuable” (Boden, 2004, p. 1). The label ‘ideas’ is 
meant to be a catch-all term covering a vast array 
of feats, including poetic images, scientific theories, 
works of art, culinary dishes, design solutions, and 
 2 As one of the reviewers for this paper pointed out to us, 
coming to terms with this aspect of the puzzle of normativity 
requires taking into account several key components of 
the social dimension. While we do not underestimate the 
significance of these steps towards an overall scientific 
understanding of creativity, further remarks on this inquiry 
into the depths of historical creativity are beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
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winning strategies. Explaining creativity under this 
definition would involve surmounting the hurdles 
to solve what we term ‘the paradox for a theory of 
creativity’. This definition could also be useful for 
assessing apparent instances of creativity and — as 
we will see below — will let us draw distinctions 
between humour in general and creative humour 
in particular.
CREATIVITY AND HUMOUR
Research on the links between humour and creativity 
has been undertaken from neurological, psychological, 
cognitive and philosophical standpoints. Some 
recent studies have explored the neural correlates 
of creativity and linked them to humour. The 
creative tasks investigated commonly range from 
narrative generation (Howard-Jones et al., 2015) to 
jazz improvisation (Limb and Braun, 2008). However, 
the researchers unfortunately discovered that the 
cortical regions associated with creativity were 
not linked and varied depending on the activity 
involved. Yet Dietrich and Kanso (2010) observed 
the common involvement of the prefrontal cortex. 
Meanwhile, Amir and Bierderman (2016) argued 
that a one-dimensional comparison between creative 
and non-creative control conditions might be ill-
suited for showing the brain functions involved in 
creative ventures. Furthermore, for them the neural 
correlates of real-time humour creation had been too 
little explored. They showed through neuro-imaging 
that greater comedic experience is associated with 
less activation in the stratum and medial pre-frontal 
cortex but with greater activation in the temporal 
association regions.
Psychologists and cognitive scientists had found 
several links and some correlations between humour 
and creativity since the 1960s. Getzels and Jackson 
(1962) studied how highly creative groups made 
more use and valued humour more than non-creative 
ones. Gordon (1962) showed that people involved in 
developing creative problem-solving systems reported 
that sense of humour is a trait consistently present 
in trainees who are comfortable in dealing with 
analogies and associative forms of thought. Treadwell 
measured the ability to create humour and related that 
ability to other measures of creativity, and concluded 
that the “…study of humor appears likely to be a 
useful approach in the study of creativity” (1970, 
p. 57). For a variety of researchers, humour can be 
considered an aspect of creativity (Amabile, 1987; 
Arieti, 1976). In fact, the way researchers measure 
creative skills usually includes valuations of humour 
(Davis and Subkoviak, 1975; Torrance, 1966). Others 
considered humour as creative expression (Koestler, 
1964; Maslow, 1971). For Murdoch and Ganim, “…
humor seemed to be sufficiently integrated to be 
considered a subset of creativity”, and that is why 
“…the two could be productively studied within 
similar conceptual frameworks” (1993, p. 66). Some 
researchers tend to treat sense of humour as a positive 
trait (Beermann and Ruch, 2009; Hong, 2010). For 
Ziv (1976) a humour-filled atmosphere promotes 
creative performance and people who were required 
to apply their sense of humour commonly use non-
traditional thinking, which enhances their creativity. 
The Hungarian-British author and journalist Arthur 
Koestler (1964) posited a strong correlation between 
humour and creativity: for him humour, scientific 
discovery, and artistic creation are forms of creativity 
that all involve the same cognitive process, which 
Koestler called ‘bisociation’. He coined this term “…
in order to make a distinction between the routine 
skills of thinking on a single ‘plane’, as it were, and 
the creative act, which (…) always operates on more 
than one plane” (Koestler, 164, pp. 35-36). 
There is another link between humour and creativity 
that has also prompted research interest, namely 
that humour can be an instance of creativity. Thus 
Chan, Chen and Lavallee have pointed out that “…
humor not only facilitates creativity but may also be 
a display of creativity in and of itself” (2013, p. 610). 
Not all instances of humour are creative but some are. 
As we saw in the previous section, creativity seems 
to involve novelty, surprise and value. So, if some 
instances of humour involve creativity, they would 
need to be at least novel, surprising and valuable.
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Theoretical approaches to humour — whether 
creative or not — have a long history. Philosophers 
took an interest in humour from the outset. Several 
philosophers (such as Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes) 
gave us insights on the laughing-at phenomenon. 
Superiority Theories (STs) of humour were mostly 
looking for the psychological causes of laughter 
and amusement: advocates of STs “…said that when 
something evokes laughter, it is by revealing someone’s 
inferiority to the person laughing” (Morreall, 2009, 
p. 7). A vast quantity of instances of humour fit well 
under STs: “We often laugh at people. The implied 
superiority is what explains the well-worn excuse: I’m 
not laughing at you; I’m laughing with you” (Hurley 
et. al., 2011, p. 41). Here is a cruel joke about lawyers 
that exemplifies STs:
Four surgeons were taking a coffee break and 
were discussing their work. The first said, “I 
think accountants are the easiest to operate 
on. You open them up and everything inside 
is numbered”.
The second said, “I think librarians are the easiest 
to operate on. You open them up and everything 
inside is in alphabetical order”.
The third said, “I like to operate on electricians. 
You open them up and everything inside is color-
coded”.
The fourth one said, “I like to operate on lawyers. 
They’re heartless, spineless, gutless, and their 
heads and their asses are interchangeable” 
(Hurley et. al., 2011, p. 41).
STs are searching for a causal explanation, not for 
a teleological explanation, a cognitive account, or 
a conceptual analysis (although some specific STs 
may cover some of these aspects). For example, Plato 
thought that laughter elicited by humour targets a 
given vice: unawareness. We laugh at people who do 
not know themselves and think that they are better 
than they really are. It is in this sense that laughter 
can be understood as a form of abuse. Similarly, Roger 
Scruton (1982) sees the laughing-at phenomenon as 
a device for the devaluation of the object of laughter 
in the subject’s eyes. As far as Plato was concerned, 
laughter had no place in a well-ordered society because 
it undermined co-operation and tolerance. He also 
thought that laughter overrode rational self-control. 
His pupil Aristotle partially shared this perspective: he 
defined humour as a form of abuse and conjectured 
that comedy began as invective (Carroll, 2014, p. 6). 
In brief, for Aristotle “…humor is the recognition 
of a failing or a piece of ugliness, resulting from 
an implied comparison between a noble state of a 
person or thing and an ignoble state” (Hurley et. al., 
2011, p. 41). STs can also explain cases in which one 
laughs at oneself. Thomas Hobbes, the paradigmatic 
defender of STs, famously remarked: “Sudden Glory, 
is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called 
Laughter; and is caused either by some sudden act 
of their own (…); or by the apprehension of some 
deformed thing in another.” (1651, p. 43). Therefore, 
when we laugh at ourselves, “…we do so putatively 
from a present perspective of superior insight that sees 
and savours the ridiculous absentmindedness of the 
person we once were” (Carroll, 2014, p. 9). Finally, 
Henri Bergson, drawing upon STs, saw laughter as 
a social corrective.
STs face major challenges and limitations, namely: (a) 
feelings of superiority are not a necessary condition 
for laughter; (b) the recognition of our superiority 
to others does appear be a sufficient condition for 
laughter (as Francis Hutcheson memorably pointed 
out, we realise that we are superior to oysters but we 
do not laugh at them); (c) we can laugh at comic 
characters superior to us; (d) it is hard to explain 
in terms of feelings of superiority why we laugh 
when we are teased in a friendly fashion; and (e) 
often the source of laughter has nothing to do with 
issues of superiority and inferiority (Carroll, 2014, 
pp. 8-16). Consider the following joke: “Theater 
sign typo: Ushers will eat latecomers” (Hurley et. al., 
2011, p. 41). Jokes like this are very hard to explain 
under STs. Additionally — as Hurley, Dennett and 
Adams suggested — this account of humour faces 
a core weakness: “although it provides a generic 
reason underlying much (if not all) humor, it does 
not provide a mechanism of humor, and thus also 
doesn’t provide a reason for the reason!” (2011, p. 
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42). Nonetheless, STs have the virtue of covering 
many humoristic instances: for example those that 
make fun of foolishness. STs can also cover the value 
of humour pointing out that laughter is pleasant, 
and the pleasure we feel is elicited by the recognition 
of our actual superiority over the object of laughter.
Release Theories (RTs) of humour mostly looked at the 
value of laughter and comic amusement. Why do we 
spend so much time and money consuming humour-
based products? Noting the purpose of humour, RTs 
claim that what fulfils this purpose is what we call 
humorous. Prompted by the Earl of Shaftesbury, Freud 
and Spencer (and maybe Aristotle in the lost second 
book of his Poetics), what RTs stress is “…that tension 
from thought can build up, and when this tension is 
released by a positive emotion that results from further 
thought, the energy is transformed into (or spent by) 
laughing” (Hurley et. al., 2011, p. 44). For Shaftesbury, 
the natural free spirits of ingenious men will find out 
other ways to slip from their constraints and revenge 
themselves on those who constrain them (Morreall, 
2009, p. 16). In Freud’s version, “…certain events create 
repressed sexual and/or aggressive energy, and when 
that tension is undone in a dramatic way (suddenly 
or surprisingly), rather than gradually, the nervous 
energy is released, and relief ensues in the form of 
humor” (Hurley et. al., 2011, p. 44). Despite the appeal 
of RTs, which explain the prominence of sexual and 
aggressive content in humour, RTs cannot explain 
logical humour. Simple puns and grammatical traps 
do not necessarily include aggressive or sexual tension.
Incongruity-Resolution Theories (I-RTs) of humour 
mostly looked for the mechanism(s) eliciting laughter 
and comic amusement. Strongly championed by 
psychologists, philosophers and cognitive scientists, 
I-RTs tell us that “…humor happens whenever an 
incongruity occurs that is subsequently resolved” 
(Hurley et. al., 2011, p. 45). Also, incongruity is a 
relational notion: “It presupposes that something 
is discordant with something else. When it comes 
to comic amusement, that something else is how the 
world is or should be” (Carroll, 2014, p. 18). A classic 
example would be this one:
O’Riley was on trial for armed robbery. The jury 
came out and announced, “Not guilty”.
“Wonderful”, said O’Riley, “does that mean I can 
keep the money?” (Hurley et. al., 2011, p. 46).
I-RTs explains comic amusement elicited by this joke 
pointing out that O’Riley response is incongruous 
with being found not guilty.
Let see another one: 
A somewhat heavy man goes into a pizza parlour 
and orders a pie. The man behind the counter 
says, “Do you want it cut into eight slices or 
four?” He thinks for a second and says, “Well, 
four. I’m on a diet”. 
I-RTs explain the comic amusement elicited by 
this joke pointing out that our common heuristics 
can go wrong in certain circumstances. Some I-RTs 
could add that the value of this humorous instance 
lies in highlighting a glitch in the way we think — 
something that helps our cognitive wellbeing.
Championed by Hutcheson, Kant and Kierkegaard, 
I-RTs have many advantages. They have practical 
use value: they provide us “…with a useful heuristic 
for the future comic research by guiding us toward 
the kinds of variables we should attend to when 
investigating specimens of invented humour such 
as comic narratives”, and “…with an eminently 
serviceable method for discovering the secret to the 
humor one encounters daily in the form of jokes, 
comic asides, cartoons, sitcoms, and so on” (Carroll, 
2014, p. 2).
However, it is unlikely that STs, RTs and I-RTs can 
fully capture the nature of humour. Nonetheless, we 
agree with Carroll in that “…using the incongruity 
theory as a heuristic may pave the way for superior 
successor theories” (Carroll, 2014, p. 2).
For our current purposes, we can work from a 
characterisation like this: comic amusement is an 
emotion that is aimed at particular objects, such 
as linguistic and intentional jokes, which meet the 
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criteria posed by I-RTs, where such appraisals then 
lead to enjoyment and a sense of levity which itself 
correlates with increased activation of the reward 
network in the brain’s limbic system. The general 
name for all those objects that give rise to comic 
amusement is humour.3
We shall focus on linguistic creative humour. 
Specifically, we address linguistic creative humour 
as the production of verbal stimuli that set out 
to cause comic amusement. In creative humour, 
novelty, surprise, and even value, could be related 
to cognitive aspects of the producers and consumers 
of humour. A humorous instance of creativity seems 
to require the search for solutions linking disparities 
in an original way that sparks surprise (Kellner and 
Benedek, 2016; O’Quin and Derks, 2011; Rouff, 
1975). Therefore, the humorous novelty could be 
understood as a type of combinational creativity 
where familiar ideas are combined in unknown 
ways (Boden 2004, p. 3; 2009, p. 240; 2016, p. 68). 
The new humorous combination elicits, as Boden 
points out, a statistical surprise whose object is what 
was previously considered unlikely. Yet even this 
improbability is intelligible, therefore valuable. As 
Boden concludes, the value of a creative instance 
depends on judgements of relevance (2016, p. 68). 
It is important to take into account that, in several 
cases, humorous effects (‘finding something funny’) 
involve some element of surprise: incongruity 
resolution; hence, creative humour, insofar as it 
requires bringing about incongruence, involves 
‘crafting surprise’. It follows that the paradox 
of a theory of creativity would disappear if the 
creative humour is not merely based on repetition 
of a social model or habit). This is so because such 
creative humour would clearly involve the elements 
ofnovelty, surprise and value. 
 3 We take the general lines of this characterisation from 
Carroll (2014, p. 5).
COGNITIVE MODELS OF CREATIVE HUMOUR
We are now in a position to frame our initial question 
concerning the prospects of naturalising creativity in a 
more bounded way. From now on, our concerns will be 
confined to the main manifestation of creativity that 
we labelled ‘creative humour’ in the foregoing section. 
We will explore to what extent this kind of creativity 
has been brought within the scope of a systematic 
understanding, involving physical entities that 
exhibit it through recognisably natural mechanisms. 
Several (perhaps complementary) approaches from 
psychology have tackled various aspects of humour 
production (relating to personality, social interactions, 
developmental stages, abnormal behaviour, and so 
forth)4. Here though, we shall focus on theories of the 
cognitive aspects of creative humour. Furthermore, the 
range of humour output we consider is confined to that 
conveyed by language. To assess and support our main 
contention (namely that that linguistic creative humour 
can be accounted for within a cognitive framework) we 
shall first present the main general tenets of Relevance 
Theory [RT] (Sperber and Wilson, 1987; 1995; Wilson 
and Sperber, 2004). We then go on to outline how the 
theory has been applied to research humour in general 
and the intentional production of linguistic humour 
in particular. We note some of RT’s accomplishments, 
promising avenues, and limitations.
Relevance Theory as a cognitive account of human 
communication
Although it is not the only cognitive approach currently 
on the market, RT has much to offer as a theoretical 
framework. According to Sperber and Wilson, RT’s “aim 
is to identify underlying mechanisms, rooted in human 
psychology, which explain how humans communicate 
with one another” (1995, p. 32). RT seeks to provide 
an empirical psychological theory that can account 
for human communication and cognition, making use 
of some assumptions from (and searching to achieve 
integration with) Evolutionary Biology. It presupposes 
that “human cognitive abilities are a part of nature; (…) 
adapted as a result of natural evolution” (Sperber and 
 4 For a contemporary overview, see Gibson (2019).
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Wilson, 1995, pp. 116-117). As part of our evolutionary 
endowment, RT posits the existence of a cognitive 
mechanism (which might not be a solely human one) 
that focuses our attention on what might be relevant 
but that makes us ignore stimuli which are not.
It is worth noting that, by claiming that human “…
cognition is a biological function” which “tends to 
be geared to the maximisation of relevance”, RT does 
not seek to provide a full description of its “process 
of Darwinian natural selection (or other evolutionary 
forces that may have helped to shape it)” (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995, p. 261). Instead, it is mainly deployed 
as a theory at the functional or computational level 
of explanation (Sprevak, 2016, §4; Bermúdez, 2006; 
2014). Put another way, it purports to describe the tasks 
performed by an organism and their ecological purpose. 
It may also shed light on the algorithmic descriptions 
of the cognitive processes at work.5
The main mechanism posited by RT is called “cognitive 
principle of relevance”. It depicts the human cognitive 
system as wired to look for relevance and dismiss 
irrelevance, being able to (unconsciously) rank different 
processing outputs (e.g., interpretations) produced by 
the same stimuli. The notion of ‘relevance’ here is a 
technical one. It can be applied both to: (1) external 
stimuli and; (2) internal representations arising from 
an individual’s cognitive processing of an input at a 
given time, and in a context that yields background 
information that is expressed in the form of his 
assumptions. Thus “it makes no sense to talk about 
the relevance of an ostensive stimulus on its own”, 
instead “relevance is a notion relative to an individual, 
in a particular context, at a particular time” (Curcó, 
1997, p. 169). In addition, there are degrees of relevance 
and it all boils down to maximising benefits (positive 
 5 Thus, it could be argued that RT is also (aiming for) an 
explanation at the algorithmic level, insofar as there is also 
an attempt to codify, in a finite number of steps, how the 
organism can perform the task. However, thus far at least, 
an exploration of the physical changes in the organism 
corresponding to those algorithmic steps —what would 
be the implementation level of explanation— has not yet 
been pursued or even envisaged.
cognitive effects) while minimising costs (mental 
processing load).6
Cognitive relevance presumably plays a crucial 
role in achieving communication. This does not 
require a previously shared code, though it may use 
one. Rather, it can be seen as an attempt to convey 
someone’s informative aims followed by successful 
recognition of the message by the target audience 
(i.e. the communicative goal is achieved).7 RT holds 
that ostensive communication requires that the 
communicator provide an ostensive stimulus (i.e., direct 
evidence of his intention to provide information). This 
might “create precise and predictable expectations 
of relevance not raised by other inputs” (Wilson 
and Sperber, 2004, p. 611), triggered by the so-called 
‘communicative principle of relevance’, which states 
that “every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of 
its own optimal relevance” (Wilson and Sperber, 2004, p. 
612). The communicator has the further task of making 
“…correct assumptions about the codes and contextual 
information that the audience will have access to and be 
likely to use in the comprehension process (…) so that 
all the hearer has to do is go ahead and use whatever 
code and contextual information come most easily to 
hand” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 43).
Under this view, even if communication involves 
an elaborated, conventionally shared code such as a 
natural language, there are significant gaps between the 
communicator’s overt ostensive stimulus (the speaker’s 
 6 Although our presentation of the cognitive principle of 
relevance is spelled out in terms of costs and benefits, 
assumptions and hypotheses, the main tenets of RT do not 
require this framing in terms of rational choice theory [RCT]. 
Interestingly, the relevance-theoretic framework can manage 
without conceiving inference from such an individualistic 
approach. We thank one of the anonymous referees for 
pointing this out. However, for expository purposes, in what 
follows we use the RCT lingo for an expedient exposition.
 7 As many naturalistic theories of linguistic meaning that 
assume that intentionality of thought is explanatorily prior to 
that of language, insofar as they “take mental representation 
to be basic and linguistic representation to be derivative”, RT 
assumes that representation in public language is (partially) 
explained by “the representational powers of mental states” 
(Papineau, 2006, p. 175).
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utterance) and what he intends to communicate (‘what 
he means’). “These gaps are filled by inference” (Yus, 
2016, p. xvi). Although guided by the cognitive principle 
of relevance (following the path of least resistance and 
looking for the most significant cognitive effects), 
the inferences involved in comprehension are split 
into non-sequential stages or ‘sub-tasks’ in which 
the recipient (the audience or hearer) constructs and 
compares “…anticipatory hypotheses about the overall 
structure of the utterance being processed” (Curcó, 
1995, p. 31). These include: a “hypothesis on explicit 
content (explanations) via decoding, disambiguation, 
reference resolution, and other pragmatic enrichment 
processes”; a “hypothesis on the intended contextual 
assumptions (the premises involved)”; and a “hypothesis 
on the intended contextual implications (the implied 
conclusions)” (Wilson and Sperber, 2004, p. 615). 
Communication is achieved when the inferential 
process leads the hearer to recover the message that 
the speaker wanted to convey.
A relevance-theoretic account of linguistic creative humour
One of the first attempts to apply the framework of 
RT to an account of humour in communication was 
undertaken by Maria Jodłowiec, who tried to “…
characterise pragmatic mechanisms (...) involved in 
the production and comprehension of verbal jokes” 
(1991, p. 242). As shown by Francisco Yus’ (2017) 
recent overview, many other studies have followed 
this relevance-theoretic orientation, both pursuing a 
similar goal or exploring kindred subjects such as: (a) 
the perception of something as humorous (whether 
intended or not); (b) possible classifications of humour; 
(c) kinds of constraints and effects involved in humorous 
comprehension; (d) humorous ironies and narratives; 
(e) conversational humour; (f) the translation of 
humour. We will not dwell on many aspects of these 
interesting subjects. Part of what is expected from RT 
as “a pragmatic theory of verbal humour” is that it 
“should be able to predict what kind of utterances and 
texts will be humorous and [explain] why” (Curcó, 
1997, p. 165). 
We will confine our attention to a relevance-theoretic 
explanation of intentional linguistic creative humour. 
A special feature of such an explanation — unlike some 
other linguistic approaches to the subject — is that it 
takes a decisively cognitive shift. It claims that “rather 
than assuming that being humorous is a property of 
texts, and hence concentrating on their structure, (…) 
what we need to understand to characterize verbal 
humour are the mental processes [involved] when 
humorous effects are derived” (Curcó, 1997: 165). As 
we stressed in our characterisation of ‘creative humour’, 
the intentional production of humorous effects (insofar 
as it is a creative process) should bear the hallmark 
features of creativity: it must be novel, have some 
value, and spark surprise. As we argued, some of those 
features are achieved by creative humour (stemming 
from surprise triggered by the incongruity-resolution 
account; value whether as cognitive debugging or as 
emotional relief). Accounting for those features in a 
systematic understanding that is in keeping with the 
natural sciences would amount to naturalising creativity. 
RT provides a useful framework for systematically 
unifying what the production of novel instances of 
linguistic humorous incongruities requires. In cases 
of intentional production of linguistic humour “the 
hearer has been forced [by the speaker…] to interpret 
the utterance responsible for the humorous climax as 
consistent with the principle of relevance, [in a way that] 
contradicts some other assumption either explicitly 
conveyed by an immediate utterance, or manifest in the 
accessible context of interpretation” (Curcó, 1997, p. 
30). Thus a surprising incongruity is produced by design, 
with the initial information presented by the speaker. 
The comedian’s interaction with the audience triggers 
his listeners to make specific anticipatory hypotheses, in 
which he exploits the cognitive relevance mechanism. 
These anticipatory hypotheses, created relying on the 
mind-reading ability of the speaker to set the hearers’ 
interpretation on a specific cognitive path, generalise 
expectations concerning the type of information 
to follow; “however, people often encounter new 
information (…) that deviates from expectations” 
(Wyer and Collins, 1992, p. 665). Thus, in linguistic 
creative humour the speaker sets up a resolvable 
incongruity by violating expectations of relevance, 
intentionally triggering the audience to revise their 
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ideas in the light of a new piece of information. Here, 
the speaker exploits his ability to guess what hearers are 
thinking in order to ‘reverse-engineer’ their inferential 
strategies and how they assimilate information. Since 
the inferences involved in comprehension require 
several non-sequential stages or ‘sub-tasks’, humorous 
incongruities may arise due to several non-equivalent 
factors, such as: the resolution of lexical and syntactical 
ambiguities; determinations of reference assignment; 
disambiguation; free enrichment and conceptual 
adjustment. This process can be structurally described in 
terms of lexical and syntactic calculations. Nevertheless, 
the main cognitive mechanism is usually tweaked 
through contextual information for the inferential 
strategies that the speaker believes are most likely to 
be used by his listeners (as we saw in the examples 
of I-RTs).8 However, in order to achieve the surprise 
required for creative humour, at least some aspects of 
the inference should be unanticipated by the audience; 
otherwise the whole thing would not be funny. Thus, 
RT shows how (notwithstanding the relevance-based 
algorithmic processing of information) creative humour 
makes people laugh by spawning novel, unpredictable 
psychologically incongruities whose resolution turns 
out to be (by design) cognitively valuable for the 
intended audience.
We have seen that RT promises to uncover the cognitive 
mechanisms used by speakers to intentionally produce 
creative instances of linguistic humour. We assumed 
that a theory explaining this kind of creativity might 
hold out hope of a fully-fledged cognitive explanation 
of overall creativity. Nevertheless, it seems that linguistic 
creative humour as portrayed by RT can be explained as a 
cognitive phenomenon. Unfortunately, it turns out that 
linguistic humour is highly dependent on the speaker’s 
ability to steer the hearer’s inferential strategies and his 
access to context along predictable paths to ‘solve’ an 
incongruity. This makes it unlikely that such a theory 
of creativity would have any predictive value. On the 
positive side, it does reveal a naturalistic mechanism for 
 8 For the reconstruction of several case studies using the 
theoretical framework of RT, see Curcó (1995; 1997) and 
Yus (2016; 2017).
humour, embodying the unpredictability of outcomes 
and explaining their cognitive value. Thus, the apparent 
paradox for a theory of creativity vanishes.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we explored some aspects of the scientific 
study of creativity by focusing on examples of linguistic 
humour. We argued that this sort of creativity can be 
accounted for within the framework of a valuable 
cognitive approach but that does not yield a recipe 
for producing novel humorous situations. We first 
identified three great puzzles that arise in attempting 
to naturalise creativity. After having explained each of 
them, we outlined some promising ways in which they 
have been addressed by cognitive studies of creativity. In 
a second section, we focused our attention on the links 
between creativity and humour. Then we restricted our 
discussion to what we called ‘creative humour’. In the 
final section, we showed how an important cognitive 
approach to human communication can account for 
creative humour.
If Relevance Theory does explain linguistic creative 
humour, being able to intentionally produce humorous 
linguistic episodes could depend on being able to 
systematically elicit amusing incongruities. However, 
the information required for creating some kinds of 
linguistic humour might only be available to someone 
who takes part in and is in the midst of conversational 
contexts. If this is indeed the case, it would be impossible 
for the information to be anticipated or generalised 
in the way that Sheldon Cooper’s Unified Theory of 
Comedy seems to require “…to elicit laughter from 
anyone at any time”. These remarks should give 
us some pause for thought on what (not) to expect 
from a naturalisation of creativity. On the one hand, 
such an explanation may not entail predictive or 
implementation capabilities. On the other hand, the 
fact that creativity appears within a systematic theory 
involving physical entities and mechanisms might be 
an indication that its explanatory power relies precisely 
on something that precludes being able to forecast its 
outcomes.
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